Mitigating Retaliatory Algorithmic Collusion in Repeated Games
arXiv:2609.20548v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reinforcement learning agents trained to maximize their own reward in repeated interactions can converge to supra-competitive outcomes resembling explicit collusion, without communication or shared…
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Published1 d ago (Fri, 18 Sep 2026 04:00:00 GMT)
RetrievedFri, 18 Sep 2026 08:00:48 GMT via rss
ClassifiedFri, 18 Sep 2026 08:01:04 GMT by heuristic
AuthorKarthik Sivachandran, Rohan Paleja