Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games
arXiv:2609.19399v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Computing Nash equilibria of simulation-based cybersecurity games with policy-space response oracles (PSRO) is bottlenecked by payoff estimation: every payoff-matrix entry costs Monte-Carlo rollouts…
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Published1 d ago (Fri, 18 Sep 2026 04:00:00 GMT)
RetrievedFri, 18 Sep 2026 08:00:48 GMT via rss
ClassifiedFri, 18 Sep 2026 08:01:04 GMT by heuristic
AuthorMichael Lanier, David Farmer, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik