Decentralized Optimal Equilibrium Learning Over Dynamic Networks
arXiv:2609.17601v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies decentralized learning of socially optimal equilibria in finite normal-form games over dynamic communication networks. Each agent observes only its own realized payoffs, does not…
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Published3 d ago (Thu, 17 Sep 2026 04:00:00 GMT)
RetrievedThu, 17 Sep 2026 15:30:40 GMT via rss
ClassifiedThu, 17 Sep 2026 15:30:51 GMT by heuristic
AuthorSeref Taha Kiremitci, Muhammed O. Sayin